The Resource Coalition formation in non-democracies, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin

Coalition formation in non-democracies, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin

Label
Coalition formation in non-democracies
Title
Coalition formation in non-democracies
Statement of responsibility
Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin
Creator
Contributor
Provider
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in nondemocratic societies where institutions do not enable political commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may challenge it and it needs to be self-enforcing, in the sense that none of its subcoalitions should be able to secede and become the new ruling coalition. We present both an axiomatic approach that captures these notions and determines a (generically) unique ruling coalition and the analysis of a dynamic game of coalition formation that encompasses these ideas. We establish that the subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game coincide with the set of ruling coalitions resulting from the axiomatic approach. A key insight of our analysis is that a coalition is made self-enforcing by the failure of its winning subcoalitions to be self-enforcing. This is most simply illustrated by the following example: with majority rule, two-person coalitions are generically not self-enforcing and consequently, three-person coalitions are self-enforcing (unless one player is disproportionately powerful). We also characterize the structure of ruling coalitions. For example, we determine the conditions under which ruling coalitions are robust to small changes in the distribution of power and when they are fragile. We also show that when the distribution of power across individuals is relatively equal and there is majoritarian voting, only certain sizes of coalitions (e.g., with majority rule, coalitions of size 3, 7, 15, 31, etc.) can be the ruling coalition. Keywords: coalition formation, political economy, self-enforcing coalitions, stability. JEL Classifications: D71, D74, C71
Member of
Cataloging source
MYG
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Acemoglu, Daron
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
  • technical reports
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1979-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Internet Archive
  • Egorov, Georgy
  • Sonin, Konstantin
Series statement
Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Series volume
working paper 06-33 [2009 revision]
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Power (Social sciences)
  • Coalitions
  • Coalitions
  • Power (Social sciences)
Label
Coalition formation in non-democracies, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin
Instantiates
Publication
Note
  • "Originally titled Coalition formation in political games."
  • "November 30, 2009. Revised: Dec. 31, 2007 & Sept. 14, 2009."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 34-36)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
mixed
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Dimensions
28 cm.
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
36 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
n
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (OCoLC)678500407
  • (OCoLC)ocn678500407
Label
Coalition formation in non-democracies, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin
Publication
Note
  • "Originally titled Coalition formation in political games."
  • "November 30, 2009. Revised: Dec. 31, 2007 & Sept. 14, 2009."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 34-36)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
mixed
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Dimensions
28 cm.
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
36 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
n
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (OCoLC)678500407
  • (OCoLC)ocn678500407

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