The Resource Coalition formation in political games, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin., (electronic resource)

Coalition formation in political games, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin., (electronic resource)

Label
Coalition formation in political games
Title
Coalition formation in political games
Statement of responsibility
Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin.
Creator
Contributor
Provider
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
  • We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may challenge it, and it needs to be self-enforcing, in the sense that none of its subcoalitions should be able to secede and become the new ruling coalition. We first present an axiomatic approach that captures these notions and determines a (generically) unique ruling coalition. We then construct a simple dynamic game that encompasses these ideas and prove that the sequentially weakly dominant equilibria (and the Markovian trembling hand perfect equilibria) of this game coincide with the set of ruling coalitions of the axiomatic approach. We also show the equivalence of these notions to the core of a related non-transferable utility cooperative game. In all cases, the nature of the ruling coalition is determined by the power constraint, which requires that the ruling coalition be powerful enough, and by the enforcement constraint, which imposes that no subcoalition of the ruling coalition that commands a majority is self-enforcing
  • (cont.) The key insight that emerges from this characterization is that the coalition is made self-enforcing precisely by the failure of its winning subcoalitions to be self-enforcing. This is most simply illustrated by the following simple finding: with simple majority rule, while three-person (or larger) coalitions can be self-enforcing, two-person coalitions are generically not self-enforcing. Therefore, the reasoning in this paper suggests that three-person juntas or councils should be more common than two-person ones. In addition, we provide conditions under which the grand coalition will be the ruling coalition and conditions under which the most powerful individuals will not be included in the ruling coalition. We also use this framework to discuss endogenous party formation. Keywords: coalition formation, collective choice, cooperative game theory, political economy, self-enforcing coalitions, stability. JEL Classifications: D71, D74, C71
Member of
Additional physical form
Abstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.
Cataloging source
MYG
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Acemoglu, Daron
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
  • technical reports
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1979-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Egorov, Georgy
  • Sonin, Konstantin
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Internet Archive
Series statement
Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Series volume
working paper 06-33
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Power (Social sciences)
  • Coalitions
Label
Coalition formation in political games, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin., (electronic resource)
Instantiates
Publication
Note
"November 30, 2006."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-55)
Color
mixed
Dimensions
28 cm.
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
55 p.
Other physical details
ill.
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (OCoLC)168036710
  • (CaSfIA)coalitionformati00acem2
  • (CaSfIA)001471502
Label
Coalition formation in political games, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin., (electronic resource)
Publication
Note
"November 30, 2006."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-55)
Color
mixed
Dimensions
28 cm.
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
55 p.
Other physical details
ill.
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (OCoLC)168036710
  • (CaSfIA)coalitionformati00acem2
  • (CaSfIA)001471502

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