The Resource Crisis and escalation in cyberspace, Martin C. Libicki ; prepared for the United States Air Force

Crisis and escalation in cyberspace, Martin C. Libicki ; prepared for the United States Air Force

Label
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace
Title
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace
Statement of responsibility
Martin C. Libicki ; prepared for the United States Air Force
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Member of
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Libicki, Martin C
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
no index present
LC call number
U163
LC item number
.L518 2012
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • United States
  • Project Air Force (U.S.)
  • Rand Corporation
Series statement
Rand Corporation monograph series
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • United States
  • United States
  • Information warfare
  • Escalation (Military science)
  • Cyberspace
  • Crisis management
  • Cyberterrorism
  • Conflict management
Label
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace, Martin C. Libicki ; prepared for the United States Air Force
Instantiates
Publication
Note
  • "RAND Project Air Force"
  • "MG-1215-AF"--P. [4] of cover
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
volume
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace
  • Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare
  • Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed?
  • A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
Dimensions
23 cm.
Extent
xxvi, 172 pages
Isbn
9780833076786
Isbn Type
(pbk. : alk. paper)
Lccn
2012046227
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
  • (OCoLC)818866331
  • (OCoLC)ocn818866331
Label
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace, Martin C. Libicki ; prepared for the United States Air Force
Publication
Note
  • "RAND Project Air Force"
  • "MG-1215-AF"--P. [4] of cover
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
volume
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace
  • Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare
  • Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed?
  • A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
Dimensions
23 cm.
Extent
xxvi, 172 pages
Isbn
9780833076786
Isbn Type
(pbk. : alk. paper)
Lccn
2012046227
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
  • (OCoLC)818866331
  • (OCoLC)ocn818866331

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